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Financial Performance 
 
AbdulRahman AlKassar 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Over the years, corporations have concentrated their efforts on increasing the 
effectiveness of their governance practices. In an attempt to decrease risk while ensuing 
higher returns to shareholders, corporations made efforts to measure such practices. Also, 
corporations focused on the financial performance of how their earnings respond to 
diverse managerial policies. Recently, there have been rising pressures on corporations to 
practice corporate social responsibility (CSR). The issue of whether or not corporations 
that are actively involved in CSR will operate and perform better has been heavily 
debated. This raises the question of whether improvement in financial performance can 
be a result of CSR practices implemented by the firm. This study examines the 
associations among corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and financial 
performance. In particular, this study explores the possible mediating effect of CSR on 
the aforementioned relationship. Empirical evidence of this quantitative study confirmed 
the significance of the relationships as well as the mediating effects of CSR.   
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
1.1 Overview 
Over the past twenty years, scholars and experts in the field, as well as practitioners, have 
been debating the key elements of corporate governance (CG) practices and the reasons 
as to why corporates engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Going further back, 
the association among corporate social responsibility and corporate governance, 
corporate governance and financial performance, and as well as the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate financial performance (CFP), have been the topic of 
discussion since 1960 at least. Past empirical studies have shown that the interrelations 
between these elements have largely been inconclusive (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; 
Beurden and Gossling 2008; Jamali et al. 2008; Baron et al. 2011). Some researchers like 
Beurden and Gossling (2008) claim that no clear answer was found as to whether or not it 
is worthwhile to engage in CSR. Additionally, the majority of the empirical studies do 
not look out for endogeneity nor causality. As such, research is rather scarce about the 
direction of causation between CG and CSR.  The connection between CG and CSR 
involvement of firms will be firstly examined by investigating the casual effects which 
have not been explored in the previous literature. The empirical association among CSR, 
CG, and CFP can be accurately addressed once the causality between CG and CSR is 
established. Afterward, the effect of CSR engagement on CFP will be explored by 
measuring the firm value and operating performance after the correction for endogenic 
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and the handling of causality cases. The examination of two categories of CG devices 
will be examined: Internally with the ownership focus on board structure, and externally 
with the takeover pressures and external monitoring by security analysts and 
organizational investors. When CG becomes well designed, it can align the incentives of 
managers with those of the shareholders as designated by the agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Bebchuk et al., 2009;). The literature frequently indicates that an 
effective CG improves CFP. However, in recent times, CG structures also require 
managers to care about their shareholders (Ricart et al. 2005; Spitzeck 2009). Freeman 
(1984) indicates that managers need to be reflected as representatives of the board 
participants in political and social processes and as promoters of the coalition between 
the external shareholders. Additionally, Freeman (1984) explains that managers need to 
grasp the rationale of the firms, the specific processes needed to govern relationships with 
stakeholders, and the chain of transactions that occur between organizations and their 
stakeholders. Freeman (1984) also states that from a firm‘s point of view, it has 
connections with a wide variety of stakeholders including governments, consumers, 
environmental advocates, media, and competitors. On an individual level, management is 
obliged to exercise prudence when it comes to socially responsible outcomes within 
every aspect of CSR (Wood 1991). As such, with the increasing prominence of 
stakeholder theory in CSR writings, to identify the relative significance of agency theory 
and stakeholder theory when it comes to the relationship between CSR, CG, and CFP, the 
random impact of CG on CSR as well as the casual impact of CSR on CG and the effect 
of CSR on CFP have to first be examined. The debate over whether investments in CSR 
enhance value, destroy value, or are not relevant to value, makes CSR a highly topical 
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subject. Discussion about CSR is growing without a universal agreement on its value or 
meaning. In its core, CSR can be seen as the growth of the efforts of businesses to 
promote CG efficiently and thus guaranteeing the continued survival of their 
establishments through healthy business practices that encourage accountability and 
transparency to the greater society as well as the shareholders. Multiple definitions of 
CSR exist. According to Friedman (1970), CSR enables a business to be conducted based 
on the shareholders‘ requests, which is usually making as much money as possible in 
compliance with the basic rules of society, which are in respect to both the law and the 
ethical custom‖. Four characteristics of CSR have been proposed by Carroll (1979, 1991, 
1999), Gatewood and Carroll (1991), and Hill et al. (2007). These characteristics are 
economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary which are later referred to as philanthropic 
(Elkassar et al. 2015). Carroll, in 2000, argued that it is not sufficient for businesses to be 
profitable and ethical. They should also complete these obligations at the same time 
despite the fact that previous studies show that companies can only concentrate on either 
social concerns or profits but not both at once. To McWilliams and Siegel (2001), CSR is 
a set of actions that seem to contribute to some social good beyond the interests of the 
firm and what is required by law. It is noticed that most definitions of CSR focus on the 
fact that its situation towards a social context further from the economic, legal, or 
technical activities of a business (Carroll 2008). In addition of the fact that CSR has 
multiple definitions, it mainly refers to working for people, communities, and the 
environment in manners that go above and beyond the legal requirements. The agency 
theory proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) led the way to the overinvestment 
hypothesis that was developed by Barnea and Rubin (2010). CSR initiatives, as suggested 
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by the overinvestment theory, do not yield a maximization of the firm value then these 
very initiatives are a waste of resources which are of a valuable nature and a potential 
value proposition. Barnea and Rubin (2010) examined empirically the relationship 
between the ratings of firms‘ CSR and their capital structure and ownership. They argued 
that insiders have a tendency to overinvest in CSR. Because an effective CG averts 
overinvestment, the explanation of overinvestment forecasts a negative correlation 
between CSR engagement and CG. Moreover, since overinvestment will reduce CFP, a 
negative correlation between CSR and CFP is expected. Meanwhile, the literature of the 
conflict resolution hypothesis has been growing (e.g., Jensen 2002, Scherer et al., 2006, 
Harjoto and Jo 2011). According to the stakeholder theory that was developed by 
Freeman in 1984, firms should employ CSR as a standard of efficient CG machinations 
to promote conflict resolution between non-investing shareholders and managers. 
Likewise, Donaldosn and Preston (1995) detail an influential characteristic out of 
normative, descriptive, and instrumental shareholder conceptions. Once the conflict-
resolution account becomes valid, the CG machinations which are effective will be 
positively correlated to CSR engagement and a positive association between CSR and 
CFP should exist as well since CSR commitment will reduce any conflicts of interest 
among the managing shareholders, managers who are not shareholders, and other 
shareholders. This resolved conflict between interests will lead to the improvement of 
CFP. 
1.2 Need for the study  
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Due to several historical failures of large establishments, corporate governance has 
changed to become a demanding concern to many corporations (Elkassar et al.2014). 
Many readings have spotted the light on the significance for acquiring good corporate 
governance to gain the public confidence and to consider the conflict of interest among 
its stakeholders (management, financiers, shareholders, etc.).Many firms still don‘t 
consider corporate governance as significant and an essential practice since it is not 
reflected to be a necessity. Also, corporate social responsibility is also becoming an 
increasingly necessary matter for firms, pushing corporations not only to implement 
corporate governance but also CSR practices in their corporate governance activities. It is 
a challenging and multidimensional structural occurrence that is stated to be the choice 
for which an association is deliberately accountable for its actions and their effect on its 
stakeholders. CSR is not only responsible for the effect on the profitable setting in which 
an individual firm functions, but also the ethical responsibilities of a company to its 
customers and the public. There is an increasing problem in which companies try to 
attempt to achieve a steadiness between their tough work to generate returns and the 
impacts of these efforts on the public.  
1.3 Research Objectives  
This research objective is to inspect and investigate the significant relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and corporate governance and their role in the corporate 
financial performance.   
1.4 Relevance of the Study  
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Upon completion, the research will demonstrate the practices of corporate social 
responsibility and corporate governance in improving a firm‘s financial performance. By 
presenting these practices, executive decision makers in any business will be able to 
maximize their performance through the existence of a relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and corporate governance. Also, this study complements previous researches 
that specified the mechanisms undertaken by each of the board of directors, executives, and 
top management to ensure a company‘s growth along with shareholders‘ return. The study 
will state the important role of corporate governance in any corporation, the effect of a 
organization practices in corporate social responsibility, and ways to measure financial 
performances. Moreover, this research will focus on improving and enhancing the practices 
of corporate governance to better govern any corporation and increase its performance. These 
mechanisms involve activities that are socially responsible towards a company‘s employees, 
customers, and the government.    
1.5 Limitation of the Study  
The questionnaire pursues the opinion of different employee levels; each employee had to 
answer from the point of view based on their department. As a result, some of the sampled 
employees exhibited minimal level of concern in the study performed. Therefore, this lack of 
worry in the topic created some limitations affecting the study. Also, the participants, who 
took part in the study, were all located in Beirut, where big firms and most SMEs exist. 
Moreover, small companies, recognized outside Beirut, are not carrying out the different 
mechanisms of corporate governance. Also, some major businesses are family owned; 
therefore, they are not implementing good governance. The core focus was on the leading 
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companies operating in Lebanon that are publicly listed and that have some form of 
partnerships.  
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Chapter II 
PRIOR STUDIES 
2.1 Literature Review  
2.1.1 Corporate Governance: An Overview 
The term ―Corporate Governance‖ is often used about the processes, systems, and 
principles that shape an organization and govern it in a way that it reaches its goals and 
targets while adding value to itself and having a positive impact on its stakeholders for 
the long term. In this particular context, the term ―Stakeholders‖ is used to include the 
management, board of directors, customers, employees, shareholders, and society at 
large. As such, the management of the organization would act as a board of trustees for 
the benefit of the other stakeholders. Transparency in transactions, fairness, compliance 
with local laws and regulations, and integrity as well as promoting accountability, 
responsibility and commitment in conducting business in an ethical manner are the very 
foundations of Corporate Governance.  It goes without saying that the core of Corporate 
Governance is the ability of those in charge to distinguish between personal and 
corporate funds.  
2.1.2 Segregation of Ownership 
Corporate Governance includes intrinsic and extrinsic factors that weigh on the decisions 
of managers when it comes to segregating ownership and control. According to Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), Corporate Governance is defined as the act of ensuring that 
management does not make bad investments or jeopardize the organization by illegally 
withdrawing from the capital of the firm for their personal benefit. Separating ownership 
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from management (Berle and Means, 1932) may cause fundamental conflicts between 
management and the providers of the capital. The suppliers of the organization‘s capital‘s 
primary concern are to maximize their profits from investing into the organizational 
entity. Due to that, they take inordinate interest in how the managers handle their 
investments. Jensen and Meckling considered the organizational entity as a nexus of 
contracts in which the opposing goals of managers and shareholders as well as other 
participants are balanced inside a carefully crafted relationship. However, due to the need 
to control costs and reducing unnecessary expenses and due to the lack of clarity in 
corporate contracts, Macey established in 1998 the need for Corporate Governance 
principles. Due to the complexity of the balance between ownership and control, several 
methods have been used to ease the operation. These methods include aligning the 
sponsors‘ interest with that of the management by having accurate disclosure of the 
compensation plans and bonus schemes for example. Other methods include board 
mentoring by large shareholders, legal protection of minority shareholders and 
expropriation through the market for corporate control as an external process. Despite its 
profundity, corporate governance still serves the straightforward goal of maximizing 
shareholder return on investment (yassin et.al 2012) . As such, the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance is commonly positive. In this light, Maher 
and Andersson (2002) have shown that corporations that refrain from adopting cost-
efficient corporate governance processes have a lesser performance and are at a higher 
risk of being replaced or taken over in the long run. 
2.1.3 Fraud, Embezzlement, Risks, and Lawsuits  
Fraud has been one of the main reasons behind corporate scandals recently.  Corporate 
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governance codes, as well as new regulations, are intending to reduce the risk of fraud 
and the resulting lawsuits in the future. In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 created 
vast amendments controlled by it. The committees, which have a widespread financial 
experience, meet frequently and go over the integrity of financial reports.  By taking a 
closer look at results that various corporations have yielded, it can be deduced that no 
correlation exists between good governance and a desirable performance. However, there 
is an agreement among experts in the field and researchers that a good system of 
corporate governance will reduce fraud, reduce business failure, and cut costs on director 
and officer insurance.   
2.1.4 Corporate Financial Performance: An Overview 
The term ―Valuation‖, according to Maliene, Deveikis, Kristen, and Malys (2010, p.36), 
is the mechanism that is used to approximate the amount of which a definite asset are 
traded between parties willing to engage in an arm length transaction. However, these 
parties are acting knowledgeably and with prudence but without any compulsion. 
Maliene et al. (2010) state that valuation is mostly used as a requirement for insurance, 
taxation, investment, accounting, and rating purposes. Furthermore, Kohli and Saha 
(2008) state that the best measure of value is the considered market price as it is set in the 
financial markets. Considering that logic, it would not be easy to assess the value of firms 
or assets that are not part of the financial markets (Anderson 2009; Artemenkov, Mikerin, 
and Artemenkov, 2008). Value consists of several concepts such as intrinsic values, book 
values, market values, economic value and fair values. These conceptions act as the 
foundation of valuation models in the analysis of investment. Accordingly, Haugen 
(1986) differentiates between the market and book values. By differentiating them, book 
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value was defined as the estimate of an accountant of the value of equity holdings in a 
specific firm based on the historical cost. Specifically, it is a book value of the global 
assets of the company for accounting, and it has fewer claims on assets. However, book 
value does not indicate future growth possibilities. The economic value, on the other 
hand, is the current value of the cash flow the asset is expected to yield (Fountaine et al., 
2008; Stowe et al. 2002). Stowe et al. (2002) and Vogt and Vu (2000) explain further by 
saying that the economic value and the market value should be one and that shows the 
amount that investors are willing to pay for a certain asset. It can also show the 
characteristics of growth prospects of that asset Stowe et al. shared a definition of asset 
valuation in 2002. According to them, within a context of corporate valuation, it is the 
approximation of the value of an asset based on factors that are linked to investment 
returns occurring in the future or on contrasting it with similar assets. Stowe et al. also 
believed that liquidated value and going-concern value are not entirely similar. A Going-
concern-value is that of a firm believing that it will keep conducting business in the 
foreseeable future. The liquidated value, however, is the present value of a firm if it 
disbanded and went out of business today without calculating the future flow of cash into 
the company; in short, it is the remaining about after deducting all the liabilities from the 
total assets. The fair value of a firm is a specific price at which the assets of that company 
would be freely exchanged between a willing seller and a willing buyer. Stowe et al. 
(2002) state that the consumer and seller must not be under any compulsion or influence 
to sell or buy the asset. This results in a difference between the fair value and the market 
value as designated by the aggregate market participants. From another perspective, 
behavioral finance theorists believe that prices can be influenced by psychological and 
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emotional factors and, as such, do not represent the accurate value of the asset (Akhter 
and Misir, 2005; Salomons, 2008).  By considering a business establishment‘s 
management, financial, and operating characteristics as well as growth aspects, the 
fundamental values can set the fair or intrinsic value.  The use of the price-to-earnings 
ratio, price-to-sales ratio, and other price-multipliers can, according to Vogt and Vu 
(2000), Stowe et al. (2002), and Lee. Obrien and Sivarmakrishnan (2008) agree on the 
fundamental valuation models used to estimate going-concern values.  As demonstrated 
by Stowe et al. (2002) and Cheng, Hsieh, and Yi (2007), P/E for a firm reaching $10.00 
per share and its average EPS (Earning Per Share) is 4, then the equity price is expected 
to be $40.00 and if the shares outstanding is of a value of 100,000 then the business 
establishment‘s value is $40.00x100, 000 shares or $4 million.  Cheng et al. (2007) 
believe that the accounting methods and earnings are related to the total value of a firm.  
Fernandez (2007) and Stowe et al. (2002) explain that the issue with price multiples 
method of valuation is that they are affected by accounting measures and choices. The 
DDM (Dividend discounting model) clarifies the values of equities as well as other assets 
by using dividend payments. The dividend is substituted by fixed interest payments for 
fixed income securities (Fabozzi, 2002; Hayes, 2006). This helps in valuing the business 
establishments that have a consistent dividend policy.  Using DDM may cause issues for 
corporations that do not pay dividends.  Once the investor is indicated as mutual funds or 
pension funds or even other kinds of institutional with the objective of influencing or 
manipulating the business, the DDM becomes inappropriate since dividends are not the 
only source of payment as described by Stowe et al. In 2002. Taking dividend policy and 
growth rate changes into consideration, it is possible to modify the constant growth 
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assumptions in the model. The Free Cash Flow (FCF) model utilizes the flow of cash 
accessible to shareholders excluding operating costs, investments in working and fixed 
capital, and interest payments as stated by Vogt and Vu in 2000 and Stowe et al. In 2002. 
In general, the free cash flow model is most effective when the firm does not pay 
dividends or the act of paying dividends is not on a timely, predictable basis (Stowe et al. 
2002). Keeping in mind that the model cannot be used effectively when the firm has any 
negative cash flows throughout the valuation period.  It is implied that stock prices of 
businesses and positive cash flows are positively correlated as the dividend payouts to 
stockholders are increased by the management. Despite that, the FCF (Free Cash Flow) 
model predicts a fall in stock prices the organization will fail to increase dividend payouts 
and use free cash flow on unprofitable investments and perquisites. The discounted 
valuation model including free cash flow and dividend models present a difficulty in 
accurately forecasting streams of cash flows over the long term. According to Stowe et al. 
(2002) and Kumar and Krishnan (2008), the valuation model is easily affected by the 
quality of data inputs. An additional instrument to value equity is the Residual Income 
(RI). Stowe et al. (2002), Anderson et al. (2008), and Fountaine et al. (2008) define it as 
‗the earnings more than the required return on financial investments. Based on the 
concept of Residual Income, Fountaine and colleagues have indicated that the market 
value added (MVA) and economic value added (EVA) are useful in the valuation of 
assets. Yet, they still viewed the economic value added as a better model than the market 
value added. Residual Income is suitable to be utilized when it is rather difficult to 
specify the terminal value of equities, when a firm has negative free cash flows in the 
timeframe around the present (recent past and the recent future), or when a firm is not 
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dividend-paying. Residual Income Model uses book values as well as expected value 
added of the business establishment. Thus, in the valuation process, according to Stowe et 
al. (2002) and Anderson et al. (2008), terminal equity values are less useful in the 
valuation process. Complexity theory and behavioral finance issues can be used to 
discard the valuation models (Blitz and Vliet (2008) and Lee et al. (2008). Instead, Blitz 
and Vliet proposed that momentum indicators should be used to value equities due to 
complex market behavior and obstacles hindering the forecasting input variables. In 
spirit, momentum indicators are a rather technical analysis and stand against the market 
efficiency hypothesis and fundamental analysis. Technical analysis as defined by Kahn in 
2010 is a method of identifying market value by utilizing market data and the interactions 
of people within the boundaries of the market. Trend analysis as well as moving averages 
are used in technical analysis to identify equity values yet price momentum strategy and 
practical analysis do not include asset-specific variables like cash flows or earnings but 
they use price levels instead as well as magnitude of trading, rate of changes of the value 
movements completed in a specific period of time as valuation puts.  Sharma and Jaitly 
suggested, in 2004, a transition from utilizing technical analysis and book values of 
valuation to market-oriented perspective of valuation or even an integrated approach that 
combines market and book values.  
2.1.5 Measures of Financial Performance 
The majority of the analysts at Wall Street as well as the investors tend to concentrate on 
return on equity as their chief indicator of company performance. Since it appears like 
this metric gets the most attention from the community of investors, numerous executives 
focus heavily on it. Whether or not it is the best metric is a debatable matter. Despite the 
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fact that various complicated valuation techniques have come along such as CFROI, DCF 
modeling, and IRR, ROE has lasted a long while. This stands to reason as ROE 
concentrates on the return received by the shareholders of the company. For shareholders, 
this provides an easy and quick to comprehend metric. It can also hide various possible 
issues. Should investors become careless, it could draw their attention away from the 
fundamentals of the business and can yield undesirable outcomes. Firms may seek 
financial strategies to mechanically achieve a flourishing ROE for a period of time and 
obscure regressing performance in the basics of the business. An increasing debt leverage 
and buybacks of stock that are financed via accumulated cash can aid in maintaining the 
establishment‘s ROE despite the fact that operational profitability is on a decline. To 
preserve the satisfaction of investors, firms engage in these strategies due to strong 
incentives such as mounting competitive pressure accompanied by mechanically low 
interest rates and the characteristics of previous twenty years. When the market demand 
for a business establishment‘s product decreases, excessive debt leverage turns into a 
solid hindrance; a fact that many companies learn during the ongoing economic decline.  
It may be because increased risks for an establishment during troubled times. Once the 
profitability that is underlying keeps on declining, debt leverage and stock buybacks will 
become more crucial in order to preserve the same levels of return on equity and thus 
leading to an increase in the exposure of the company to unforeseen troubles in consumer 
demand or financial market crisis and thus leading to an addictive behavior. Due to the 
fact that the impact on stock performance can be instant, leaving ROE to decline is often 
not easy to consider thus it is understandable as to why some might seek to delay this as 
the risks otherwise might be less quantifiable and not as swift. The authors of Shift Index 
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followed a different bottom-line metric for corporate financial performance due to these 
issues with ROE. Return on assets bypasses possible impairments caused by financial 
strategies such as the aforementioned ones. Similarly, ROA measures financial 
performance in a superior way than income statement profitability measures such as 
return on sales. ROA also expressly takes into consideration the assets utilized to 
reinforce business activities. It finds out whether or not the business will be able to gather 
a competent return on these assets instead of just showing dynamic return on sales. While 
companies that are light on assets can harvest a great return on assets from thin margins 
of net income to support the business, companies that are heavier on assets need to meet a 
higher threshold. Numerous companies lease manufacturing and logistics operations that 
are asset intensive to other more specialized service providers in an attempt to transform 
their business into a light asset one. While these assets have not been removed, they 
virtually shifted from one company to another. These asset investment must surely be 
harvested as reasonable returns. It goes without saying that even those light asset firms 
have a number of limited current and fixed assets needed to support the business. By 
using ROA as a key performance measure, management can focus its attention on the 
assets that are crucial to running the business. While executes are free nowadays to 
outsource the management of these assets to specialized companies, the essential question 
to be asked remains as to who is the more fitting position to reap the highest returns on 
those assets. By keeping this interrogation in mind, executive teams are helped on 
focusing their own dealings more thoroughly on actions and assets they are the most 
qualified to govern and to outsource to other companies the ones they are less qualified to 
manage. Capability leverage aids a firm through the phases of an economic cycle by 
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acting as a solid alternative to control which becomes an inescapable a huge burden in an 
economic downturn. By outsourcing to specialized providers, profitability can be 
achieved more quickly and with greater numbers because of the diversity, scope, and 
scale of their operations. This helps companies grow rapidly during an economic upturn.  
Recovering during downturns can be aided by variable cost outsourcing agreements.  
Since financial leverage simply assisted in increasing returns to shareholders by being 
readily available, various companies have been lead to disregard the potential of 
capability leverage. ROA trends that are used for long-terms shed light on the importance 
of the options of capability leverage. Increasing economic pressures are mostly hidden by 
the current measurements and time frames used. This is not basically an indicator for 
current economic downturns. By studying the long-term trends the conclusion that the 
traditional approaches to business are fundamentally flawed can be reached. This erosion 
is happening even though there is a shift towards businesses with light asset activities and 
in spite of the absence of the talent of the workforce, a crucial asset, from the balance 
sheet. 
2.1.6 The Relation between Corporate Governance and Financial Performance  
Over the recent years, various researchers have been progressively concerned on how CG 
impacts the firm‘s financial performance. Until this date, a widespread range of studies 
demonstrates that no agreement among investigators has been reached (Agarwal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Xu and Wang, 1997; Lehman and Weigand, 2000; Gruszczynski, 2006; 
Black et al., 2006; and Berthelot et al., 2010). A number of these studies have concluded 
a positive substantial effect of CG on financial performance. For example, Drobetz et al. 
(2004) determined that methods for dealing with firm value such as measurement of 
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business assets in relation to a firm's market value (Tobin‘s Q) and market-to-book value 
are significantly linked to better more efficient CG practices. There is a significantly 
positive connotation between Tobin‘s Q / market to book value and CG which is made up 
of 51 principles of internal and external governance instruments. When we are discussing 
developing economies in accordance with Mohanty (2004), there is a substantial positive 
relationship between CG practices and financial performance as measured by Tobin‘s Q 
and excess stock return. Black et al. (2006) examine whether the overall CG is connected 
with the market value of public companies in Korea. The results display that a stable CG 
forecasts sophisticated market values. In parallel, it indicates a reduction in the firm‘s 
cost of capital, as an effect of a better CG that is greatly valued by stakeholders. In 
contrast, Ehikioya (2009) inspects the relation between CG structure and firm 
performance for 107 corporations listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The outcomes 
report the positive association between ownership concentration and firm performance 
where the significantly focused proprietorship structure defends the welfares of 
depositors and additional shareholders. On the other, there is no relationship among board 
arrangement and corporate performance. Board size, number of outside directors, and 
family-owned share obviously touch bank performance as reported by Huang (2010). 
This articulation is consistent with the conclusion of Varshney et al. (2012), who 
delivered observed signs that a decent CG practices noticeably touch a company‘s 
performance as a measure of economic value. However, during the usage of other 
traditional performance dimensions, such as Tobin‘s Q, return on capital used, and return 
on assets, are to be measured, this connection cannot be confirmed. Although by the 
tremendous efforts made by the OECD to improve the progressive association between 
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the optimal practices of CG and corporate performance, such a connotation is not as 
straightforward, in specific, in in cooperation of transition economies and emerging 
markets. In accordance to Aboagye and Otieku (2010), they found no relationship 
between the states of CG among rural and community banks in Ghana and their financial 
performance. In addition, Al-Tamimi (2012) specifies the positively significant 
association among the CG activities carried out by UAE national banks and their 
performance level. In this context, Makki and Lodhi (2014) examine the being of a 
dangerous organizational association concerning CG, intellectual capital proficiency and 
firm‘s financial performance. They found no direct relationship among CG and a 
corporation‘s financial performance. However, an effective CG in a company has a 
significant progressive influence on intellectual capital efficiency which ultimately 
improves its financial performance. In the Egyptian setting, Elsayed (2007) examines the 
association among CEO contrast and business performance for 92 Egyptian businesses 
throughout the period from 2000 to 2004. The observed results does not show indication 
concerning the effect of CEO contrast on business performance. Moreover, the positively 
significant outcome can be distinguished during low corporate performance. Omran et al. 
(2008) study the link between possession focus as a CG practices and corporate financial 
performance, by means of 304 companies as a demonstrative set from the Arab equity 
markets, counting Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Tunisia. The conclusion resulted in that there 
is no significant impact on the performance in possession focus firms. Opposing to the 
agency theory (CEO non-duality structure) and the stewardship theory (CEO contrast 
structure), Elsayed (2010) reveals that the suitable board management formation differs 
with firm size, time of life, and tenure structure. In addition, Elsayed (2011) discovers a 
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positive connotation among board magnitude and corporate financial performance in the 
presence of CEO non-duality. Nevertheless, such relationship turns to be negative in the 
existence of CEO contrast. What Wahba (2015) came up with using a sample of 40 
Egyptian-listed corporations proves that the growing percentage of non-executive board 
participants under CEO contrast shows no effect on the firm financial performance. In the 
light of the above varied outcomes, the predictable progressive effect of internal and 
external CG practices is highly affected by the environment. 
2.1.7 Corporate governance and financial suffering 
The relationship among financial suffering and CG has derived the lead in the academic 
discussion ever since the 1980s. For this relationship to be validated, the straightforward 
stream in various studies concerning this study is dedicated on clarifying how CG 
practices in healthy corporations vary from those in firms that are suffering and their 
impression on the likelihood of default (Daily and Dalton, 1994; Elloumi and Gueyié, 
2001; Lee and Yeh, 2004; Wang and Deng, 2006; Persons, 2007; Swain, 2009; Al-
Tamimi, 2012). Another course of financial suffering researches emphases primarily on 
the influence of CG practices on the endurance of the firms that are in pain (Cutting and 
Kouzmin, 2000; Parker et al., 2002; Muranda, 2006). On the subject of the relationship 
among CG and financial suffering, Hambrick and D‘Aveni (1992) states that having a 
dominant CEO as a weak practice of CG is more likely to be associated with firm 
bankruptcy. On the contrary, Daily and Dalton (1994) approve the progressive 
relationship among the probability of bankruptcy and ruthless mechanisms of CG as 
measured by CEO contrast and lesser individuality between the firm‘s directors. Lee and 
Yeh (2004) spread their study by providing a valid indication that corporations with 
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fragile CG, escalates the capital expropriation hazard and, as a result, decreasing the 
business‘s value. Hereafter, the outlook of default is extremely anticipated. Moving 
forward to the Chinese provisional economy, Wang and Deng (2006) proves that there is 
no association of financial suffering likelihood and CG practices such as bulky 
stockholder possession, public possession, and the percentage of self-regulating directors. 
On the contrary, other CG traits including CEO contrast, board scope, executive 
possession, and degree of well-adjusted possession, have negative influence on the 
likelihood of defaulting. Likewise, Abdullah (2006) states that there is a negative 
relationship among the concerned status of Malaysian companies and proprietorship 
structure, as measured by the proportion of stocks held by executive directors, non-
executive directors and external main stockholders. Furthermore, the possession 
concentration, state control, ultimate owner, self-determining directors and inspectors‘ 
opinion are adversely connected with the probability of financial suffering Li et al. 
(2008). On the other hand, a positive connotation was found between the managerial 
expenditure ratio and the likelihood of financial suffering. Additionally, administrative 
possession shows a negative impact on monetary distress. Nevertheless, a progressive 
substantial association among financial suffering and the CG mechanisms of UAE 
national banks was found by Al-Tamimi (2012). Concerning the influence of CG 
mechanisms on the endurance of the concerned corporations, an examining of 176 -
financially distressed firms in the USA by Parker et al. (2002), shows no noteworthy 
connotation among the replacement of the CEO with a stranger and the probability of the 
firm‘s endurance. Nevertheless, a huge percentage of foremost shareholders and eternal 
possession shows a positive effect of the likelihood of an organization‘s durability. 
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Likewise, Muranda (2006) examines the association between CG failures and financial 
suffering, taking eight Zimbabwean financial institutions facing financial distress. The 
outcomes delivered empirical evidence that lacking an independent board generates 
supremacy of inequality in the board. Such differences among executive and non-
executive board participants lead to the failure of board efficiency. Clarification of such 
an association is a need after this unique relationship between CG and corporate financial 
distress. 
2.1.8 The impact of different governance procedures; and the different procedures 
of the firm’s performance 
Firm-level governance instruments can be categorized to two wide-ranging 
classifications: internal and external governance instruments (Gillan, 2006). Internal 
governance means that corporate governance configurations and procedures are within 
the control of the corporation‘s stakeholders and the board of directors (Brown et al., 
2011). Consequently, internal governance instrument is measured by board of directors 
and stakeholders. However, takeover and market for corporate control are primarily 
regarded as external mechanism (Cremers and Nair, 2005). Therefore, external 
governance instrument is measured by anti-takeover guides. According to Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), the foremost procedure of governance is concluded by the market for 
corporate control (external governance). In respect to this argument, a study by Gompers 
et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) (hereafter BCF, 2009),  reveals the influence of 
anti-takeover guide which is a substitution for external governance instrument of 
corporate financial performance and evidence a significantly positive impact of external 
governance on firm performances. However, Cremers and Nair (2005) document that 
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both internal and external governance are significant in clarifying company‘s 
performance than any of those in separation. Their study demonstrations that the 
importance of governance measured by only external mechanism in Gompers et al. 
(2003) is strengthened particularly when the role of internal governance instrument is 
also considered. Their outcome is reinforced by Brown and Caylor (2009) who made a 
parsimonious index, Gov-7, based on seven features including two external instruments 
and five internal instruments. They demonstrated that the index entirely pushes the 
connection among governance and corporation value detailing that effective corporate 
governance involves both internal and external procedures. Hodgson et al. (2011) 
investigates the Thai Institute of Directors‘ (IOD) corporate governance index which 
includes both internal and external governance procedures on financial performance of 
the Thai listed companies over a period of 2001-2006. They found a progressive 
association among corporate governance levels and the financial performance metrics. A 
study about the role of corporate governance in International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) merging of Chinese listed companies was conducted by Chen and 
Rezaee (2012). They discovered that internal governance instrument such as efficiency of 
board of directors touches the degree of IFRS convergence directly and indirectly by 
using external governance mechanism such as inspection quality. Numerous other 
investigates, such as Hadlock and Lumer (1997), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Schulze 
et al. (2002) and Anderson and Gupta (2009), also classify the balancing association 
among these two governance dimensions. A study finds that the mixture of internal and 
external governance inspires superior investment and eradicates payment extraction by 
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upper executive further than any of those governance procedures single-handedly 
Acharya et al. (2011). 
2.1.9 Financial Performance Accounting perspective 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) are the accounting procedures for 
the short-term operational performance of the company, reflecting a touchable, and 
balance-sheet outcome with the result of corporate governance that is already combined 
in the accounting significance. In contrast, the long-term significance of the company has 
more to do with market observations around the importance of corporate governance. A 
more reliable measure of performance to be considered is the Market measures, as 
accounting procedures can be actually manipulated at the management freedom of choice 
(Cochran and Wood, 1984 and Rhoades et al., 2002). For that reason, a minority of the 
researches examining the influence of governance on performance is emphasized on 
market value. Nevertheless, there is a significant argument concerning the relationship 
among governance and measurements of corporation‘s performances. According to 
Gompers et al. (2003), he reveals that depositors do not regularly recognize practices of 
corporate governance on the corporation‘s market value. Furthermore, a study that ROA 
is a healthier measure for investigating the relationship among performance and corporate 
governance was suggested by Core et al. (2006). On the other hand, the stockholders‘ 
value maximization theory proposes that market value identified must be the accurate 
measurement of performance. A study conducted recently addressing the association 
among corporate governance and firm performance detects various results. For example, 
using a combined sample practice, Fosberg (1989) finds that there was no link between 
governance measured by the percentage of external directors on the board and firm 
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performance, i.e. ROE. Klein (1998) detects that there is no association among 
governance measured by complete board independence and ROA. Nevertheless, by 
proceeding into the internal mechanisms of the board, i.e. board committee arrangement, 
Klein finds that internal incidence on specific finance and investment committees have an 
assured impression on ROA. Performing a large-sample, long-horizon study on American 
large firms, Bhagat and Black (2002) find no relation between board independence 
(fraction of independent directors minus the fraction of inside directors on a company‘s 
board) and ROA. In contrast, there are plenty full of studies which detect a progressive 
association among governance and performance, such as Drobetz et al. (2004), Beiner et 
al. (2006), Bhagat and Bolton (2009), Core et al. (2006) and Bauer et al. (2008). 
Moreover, all of these researches consider the perception in developed economies. 
Therefore, Cheung et al. (2007, 2010 and 2011) derived numerous readings on emerging 
Asian countries such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, India, Singapore, 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Taiwan which are considered by possession focus and by this 
means deficiency of takeover hazard. They came up with an innocently progressive 
association among corporate governance (measured by either Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD] principles or Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
[CLSA] governance provision) and firm performance (Tobin‘s Q and ROA).  In contrast, 
researchers conducted on Latin American nations, counting Brazil by Carvalhal da Silva 
and Leal (2005), Chile by Lefort and Walker (2005), Argentina by Bebczuk (2005), 
Mexico by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2006) and Venezuela by Garay and Gonzalez 
(2008), demonstrate a progressive association among governance score and firm value. 
2.1.10 How is the cost of capital influenced by corporate governance? 
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A commonly held belief states that there are lower capital costs when an effective 
corporate governance is implemented. The reason to that could be the lower risk resulting 
from corporate governance techniques that would lead to lower capital costs. That is not 
the only explanation. Another research lies, believes that greater disclosure enhances 
liquidity in the stock market and thus creating a lower capital cost. This is supported by a 
study conducted by various people including Verrecchia on 1999, Leuz and Verrecchia in 
2000, and Botosan and Plumlee in 2002. Lower barriers to information are crucial to 
lowering the cost of capital, as such, it is highly relevant for management to be 
committed to being transparent with shareholders.  A strong positive correlation is noted 
between reduced capital costs and business valuation for firms. What these factors 
primarily suggest is that transparency and clarity between the management and 
shareholders when it comes to financial information would reduce uncertainty and thus 
cut costs from the capital. 
2.1.11 Corporate Social Responsibility: An Overview 
The notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) takes a firm beyond the economic 
atmosphere it is typically associated with. It takes issues in the social environment and the 
involvement of numerous criteria that are about the firm‘s behavior. CSR, in general, is 
bearing a set of rights and responsibilities towards the general society at large that 
surrounds the establishment and does not allow it to focus solely on economic 
management to obtain a corporate or business objective. The day to day activities of firms 
is shaped by various challenges beyond the economic and legal ones such as ethics, 
environmental causes, and social facets. If an establishment works solely on maximizing 
equity, it will miss meeting its social challenges. Classically, a company is defined as an 
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economic unit that engages in the production of goods for the purpose of sating needs. It 
is influenced by the maximization of utilities implying the maximization of the 
beneficiary‘s equity. To some, this methodological concept may appear as origination 
from Hedonistic and Utilitarian schools that act as the foundations of economic sciences. 
CSR integrates into the impression that a firm‘s most important purpose is to maximize 
the owners‘ equity and broadens its objectives to involving socioeconomic facets. 
According to a study conducted in 2005 by Robbins and Coulter, In 2005, Robbins and 
Coulter suggested that social responsibility of a firm‘s management reaches farther than 
the pursuit of economic profits and it consists of the empowerment and growth of 
society‘s wellbeing in general. The concept is based on the notion that corporates do not 
only satisfy the needs of their owners but also serve a larger set of stakeholders who are 
social influences with the interest in the establishment.  While the concept of corporate 
social responsibility might seem complex, to some, it only serves the basic need of 
continued existence and assured survival. A concept developed by Bestrate‘n and Pujol in 
2005 highlights the suggestion that a company that practices corporate social 
responsibility is economically competitive and is trying to ensure its continued existence. 
The authors state that the company must fulfill certain requirements. For instance, the 
company must act ethically when it comes to decisions that impact the greater culture of 
the organization. It should also offer services and products that satisfy the user‘s needs, 
respect the environment, integrate the company into the community around it, and 
perform beyond the minimum regulations.  Stating that the business must be homogenous 
with its surrounding environment infers implicitly that CSR is a multifactorial topic. This 
is a criterion that must be kept in mind while evaluating CSR. 
28 
 
According to a study conducted by Lozano in 2003, the European and North American 
views on CSR are not coherent. In the United States, the concept of CSR consists of an 
influential management setup on the other stakeholders. Those who have the ability to 
influence the company or weigh on its decisions are the companies taken into 
consideration.  In contracts, the European definition ties CSR to the global vision of the 
organization. Despite the fact that Lozano states that establishments in Europe focus on 
the relationships with local communities, they tend to place more weight on all the 
operations in which the firm is involved especially in matters related to politics and social 
aspects in which the firm conducts business.  
2.1.12 The Types of Corporate Social Responsibilities for Businesses 
CSR, as defined by its promoters, covers a comprehensive range of issues that include 
employee relations, corporate ethics, human rights, mass layoffs, and community and 
environmental relations among others.  As such, CSR Europe, an organizational that 
contains big companies across the continent as members, states the following guidelines 
for CSR:  
      - Employees(work setting) 
      - Customers and suppliers (market setting) 
      - Community/Government 
      - Environment 
      - Human rights  
      - Ethics 
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The economic approach the establishment follows is the key factor in deciding whether 
or not the firm would enforce a CSR system and the action plans that would subsequently 
be taken. To those who have a neoclassical perspective on what a firm is would assume 
that the sole social responsibilities that are needed are payment of taxes and provisions of 
employment. ―Few trends would so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our 
free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to 
make as much money for their shareholders as they possibly can‖ as said by Milton 
Freidman (in 1962 on page 133 of his publication). There is nothing less than taking the 
aforementioned view to the extremes of maximizing shareholder value.  A different 
approach on the topic that is presented by Cyert and March, behavioral theorists, in 1963 
(cited in Wartick and Wood, 1998). From this outlook, corporate social activity is viewed 
as influences of non-economic nature and because of political facets on managerial 
behavior. Personal motivations could also be a deciding factor. A top executive‘s 
personal choices and opinions or a specific perspective that is correlated with the 
exercising of power are examples of such. This perception on corporate social activity 
has two main strands; the first states that it is the role of business to aid in the solving of 
social problems since it has resources and thus has a moral or ethical obligation. As such, 
a study conducted on the attitudes of executives over social responsibility in 1976 
(Holmes), became apparent that adding to the profitability, solving social problems 
should be helped by the business whether or not this business is involved in the creation 
of those problems, even if there is no probably short run or long run profit possibility. In 
other words, because a business employs resources and skills, there is a somewhat moral 
obligation to enact corporate social responsibility. This may be the perspective of 
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executives but not those of the beneficiaries or owners of the corporate. Those who 
support CSR believe that it is of the interest of the business to implement several methods 
of CSR.  Enhanced reputation, greater employee loyalty, and retention, as well as others, 
are some of the business benefits of CSR.  
In Australia, a study supports the aforementioned analysis. The study, which was 
conducted in 2000 by CCPA tackled the issue of motivation by business community 
engagement. The results suggest that Australian businesses are undergoing a change in 
expectations of their social part or role and one of the reasons for this is that the social 
role is a factor for continued growth and health of firms and establishments conducting 
business. The study also shows that about three-quarters of the companies that were 
involved have a goal of directing a sustainable business that lasts for a long term ―at the 
heart of the ‗business case‘ for community involvement‖. One tenth of the companies 
involved views that social obligation is exclusively achieved by ―returning value to their 
shareholders‖ while another 10 percent claims that community involvement is a method 
for ‗putting back‘ without the intention of seeking a return.  
Three distinct patterns can be observed thus far, and they are a rightful approach with ties 
to social expectations, a neoclassical approach, and a distinguished self-interest. 
Additionally, social legitimacy is referenced to possibility imply that there is an essence 
of social expectations that any legitimate business would follow.  It may be viewed as a 
form of social contract. What the point left to debate is whether or not the proponents of 
advanced or enlightened self-interest are motivated by any profit-based incentive as 
promoted by Friedman and as such concur with him with regards as to whether CSR is 
the method to achieving the optimal shareholder wealth or whether an ethical or moral 
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latent demand. By currently tackling the nature of CSR, this issue becomes apparent. 
CSR Europe‘s method consist of stating that businesses reap benefits from being 
responsible socially which in turn will positively impact their sales, the trust in the 
company, and their workforce in general. The key objective ultimately remains to provide 
a sustainable expansion or growth for the business in a flawless, responsible, and ethical 
manner.  
2.1.13 The Various Components of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Unlike responsibility which is assigned, applied even mistakenly to a group, or forced 
upon an entity, accountability alludes to the behavioral pattern of an individual in a 
precise social structure or situation as stated by Wood and Winston in 2007 (p. 168). 
Accordingly, Sedikides et al.(2002) claimed that in a business setting, the corporate that 
adopts the concept of accountability is in line with prevailing norms and it also gives 
justification to the demeanor that strays from those very norms. Research conducted in 
2000 by Crowther suggest that the correct measures as well as reporting techniques aid in 
the identification of what a firm is accountable for while that there is a growing 
expectation for companies to show accountability regarding the business actions (Feltus 
and Petit, 2009). In other words, accountability is seen as an obligation to provide a 
report or account of the activities to which an entity is held responsible Openness as a 
concept has been discussed extensively by researchers, psychologists, and experts in the 
field as a driving factor. It is also one of the main elements of accountability according to 
Tetlock (1999) primarily because communication concerning the organization‘s core 
fundamentals such as its vision, values, and effectiveness have also to be shared with the 
public as well as the stakeholders. ―Answerability‖ is another fascinating term that 
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associates itself with accountability. It is the undertaking of initiatives to describe actions, 
engagements, and decisions (Wood and Winston, 2007). The utilization of application of 
accountability standards such as ISO series and Sustainability Reporting Guidelines is an 
effective means of placing this duty in use due the fact that they impose on firms 
restrictions requiring standard guidelines that demand the fulfillment of relevant criteria.   
Transparency, according to Faust and Svensson‘s 2001 definition, is the level of efficient 
information about control errors.  While corporate transparency is seen as a cluster of 
characteristics of the operation that facilitates the process of understanding and analyzing 
firm-specific information for participants from outside the company (Bushman et al., 
2004).  Better strategic outcomes and an elevation in the credibility of the corporate 
social responsibility of the firm are the fruits of greater transparency according to Jensen 
(2002). By conducting business, businesses need to come up with action plans and 
strategies to fulfill the objective of transparency to promote and ensure public confidence 
in their products and services when it comes to quality, integrity, and effectiveness.  
Undermining the sureness of consumers can lead to a greater pressure from the public for 
more transparency and more tangible evidence of ethical conduct. The scandals related to 
Enron and WorldCom are examples of such. For firms, the suitable level of transparency 
is an arrangement related to flexibility among other traits. (Chortaeas et al., 2002).  
To become sustainable, companies must focus on competitiveness as it plays a crucial 
role in their survivability in the market. According to Price and Newson (2003), firms 
cannot basically provide quality of services or products, but they must also reveal the 
CSR management of their business. Through all-encompassing policies of social and 
environmental nature, global firms unveil their effective management   (Snider et al., 
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2003). These machinations improve the standing of the companies with their stakeholders 
and thus increase the reputation as a study conducted by Rindova et al. In 2005 shows. 
While there may be no shared history between a specific supplier and a buyer, a positive 
reputation may indicate the supplier‘s goodwill and competency (Campbell, 1999). 
According to Rindova et al. (2005), the reputation of an organization is essentially 
gathered from aggregated acknowledgment and reactivity that a firm has harvested in a 
specific field of business. On the other hand, stakeholders carefully take notice of the 
firm‘s behavior and form a perception of it over the length of time. As such, reputation is 
an important factor in reducing stakeholder uncertainty, and the buyers can make use of 
the supplier‘s reputation to base their trust on (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) and to evaluate 
the cost and benefit of their business with that exact supplier (Barone et al., 2004).  
According to Sharma (2005) and Corbett et al. (2005), there is a positive correlation 
between the enhancement of competitiveness and the improved financial performance of 
the corporate.  
According to a series of studies conducted in 2002 by Ledgard and Taylor and Waddock 
et al., stakeholders are found to be the primary force that is pushing business 
establishments towards corporate responsibility. Composing the CSR agenda takes a high 
strategic decision set of skills. As such, business managers need to consider in which 
section of CSR they ought to invest in (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Husted, 2003). 
Bansal and Hunter (2003) explain that firms could use machinations to support their 
strategies to deliver a strong message about the establishment‘s commitment to 
responsibility. Interconnected internal and external systems are crucial to mitigate 
pressure on corporate responsibility. Developing internal responsibility management 
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systems can help the management set the grounds for corporate standards and codes of 
conduct that help guarantee the implementation of the aforementioned systems 
(Waddock, 2006). Such systems also grant the ability for firms to be at a minimum need 
to adhere to universally accepted standards of practice and norms yet externally, these 
systems give credibility (Bansal and Hunter, 2003; Waddock, 2006). Waddock et al. 
(2002) also explain that for public expectations to be encountered about CSR, a Total 
Responsibility Measurement (TRM) approach may be used. The TRM aids firms 
perceive the responses of the pressures. Terlaak and King (2006) claim that international 
standards could act as a credible signal of process quality control. Organizations 
nowadays need to turn on public issues with a greater proactive approach to reveal their 
responsibilities towards numerous stakeholders as they are encountered by social 
demands and expectations that are imposed externally.  
2.1.14 The Relation between Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate 
Governance 
After the last decade, it was clear that the emphasis on CSR and CG practices increased 
exponentially in investor codes, companies‘ best practices, corporation law and different 
securities regulatory framework.  During the last few years, the common institutional CG 
structure that has been used was slowly being replaced by a much newer institutional 
structure. This however did not stop the formation of inconsistencies and gaps from 
forming which mainly concerned CSR and stakeholder engagement. It is understood that 
CG is formed of both internal and external factors, which influence the management of 
firms. Most often, the leadership methods are found to perform a noteworthy role in 
socially accountable establishments (Shahin and Zairi, 2007). When viewing CG from a 
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practitioners point of view, we see that both structural and behavioral factors including 
responsibilities and actions towards stakeholders and shareholders alike. When looking to 
solving and the reduction of the conflict of interest among both the non-investing 
shareholders and the managers, companies tend to apply CSR engagement along with 
governance methods (Jo and Harjoto, 2011a). There are two perspectives of the 
association between CG and CSR such as: first, the role of different institutional 
environments and cultures; and second, studies that link governance and CSR 
endogenously; contrary, neither CSR nor CG are viewed as a static and independent 
phenomenon (Devinney et al., 2013). Depending on the legal system that each firm uses 
along with the characteristics of specific countries, we find the relationship between CSR 
and CG to vary in aspects pertaining to boards of directors, ownership parties and 
executive incentives (Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014; Rao and Tilt, 2015). The inclusion 
of CSR into governance comprises of the economic environment, national governance 
system, regulation and soft law, shareholders, national culture, behavioral norms and 
industry impacts (Young and Thyil, 2014). 
2.1.15 CSR, CG and External Environment 
Most of the time, companies are much more liable to integrate CG and CSR disclosure 
practices when they release information of social and environmental content along with 
activities that focus on CSR internal issues (Kolk and Pinkse, 2010). It is clearly observed 
that when a company‘s CSR goes hand in hand with good CG practice, the resulting 
mixture is of positive nature. At the country level, a greater level of development may 
well allow and form pressures for better CSR practices, while it forces the improvement 
of CG (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012). Firms communicating CSR have the tendency to 
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be great manufacturing establishments in a relative rule-based societies (Li et al, 2010). 
When viewing factors that give significant driving force to CSR communications, it is 
clear that the country‘s governance environment is a major factor forcing companies to 
be persuaded into having stronger CG practices. It is believed that and effective corporate 
code that is socially responsible along with an effective CG structure, would lower the 
chance of incorrect actions because of the mere effect they would have on shareholders 
(Beltratti, 2005).  
2.1.16 CSR, CG and Emerging Economies  
The adoption process of CG framework has seen a steady rise in emerging economies, 
which mainly use the Anglo-American model. In developing countries, policy makers 
will need to strengthen their vigilance and capacity in the field of the regulation process 
and the judicial system when it comes to CG reforms. Further, to reinforcing 
organizational pressure, predominantly intimidating and normative in nature, hence, to 
improve CSR practices of firms (Jamali et al., 2008).  When looking at the case of 
Russian bank employees and state-holding, a study suggested that stakeholders remain to 
have close to no significant involvement in the process of decision making when it comes 
to the majority of manufacturing companies. This in turn led to the state having the major 
role of offsetting dominant insider shareholders and, due to the institutional weakness, 
enforcing good corporate governance principles (Wright et al., 2003). Another example is 
Singapore, where the institutional environment has many difference from its western 
counter parts which makes for a weak market for corporate control which includes stock 
ownership and considerable ownership in many private sector companies (Mak and Li, 
2001). Mauritius companies can largely be related to the concept of sovereign 
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governance, with a minimalist board, a substantive change in the type of board 
accountability and encourages board interactions (Soobaroyen and Mahadeo, 2012). 
Ordinarily a lower level of compliance requirements, with reporting on risk, shows a 
more past view rather than the more future view that could come from qualitative risk 
disclosure. Therefore, the key determinants of risk reporting revolve around competition, 
board size, role duties and ownership concentration as the study revealed (Mokhtar and 
Mellett, 2013). The government initiatives in encouraging CSR among government firms 
through the overview of the Silver Book in 2006 had an optimistic impact on CSR 
disclosure in the annual reports (Esa and Ghazali, 2010). When boards are mainly of 
Malaysian directors, an association is made between corporate social disclosures. While 
on the other hand, boards dominated by executive directors who are chairs with multiple 
directorships and foreign share ownerships tend to also confirm significant corporate 
social disclosers (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). The variable of corporate governance has 
direct positive effects on CSR activities and on social performance especially in the case 
of China (Lau et al., 2014; Lu, et al., 2015). In the Indian context various ownership 
structures are present such as: family, government, professional and multinational 
companies. Some changes that have occurred in the principles have resulted in the 
transformation of the institutional and legislative system that significantly differs from 
the forms of business ownership, which have emerged lately (Gollakota and Gupta, 
2006). There are increasing concerns in the new global economic order and the salience 
of the primary stakeholder groups that drive companies to implement CSR policies of 
elements such as labor, community relations, environment, customer safety, supply chain, 
and corporate governance. (Mishra and Suar, 2010).  
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2.1.17 CG, CSR & Stakeholder 
Stakeholder friendly policies and business practices can be more associated with CG 
nowadays (Gill, 2008). By creating value-creating relationships with all stakeholders, 
good CG provides the fundamentals of good CSR (Welford, 2007). The stakeholder 
theory is a functional instrument for gathering and appraising CSR data and demonstrates 
that the stakeholder awareness of CSR performance creates corporate initiatives to a 
certain target (Kansal and Joshi, 2014). While being complementary tools, the 
relationship between CSR and CG is used by most of the firms to improve and increase 
the standing relationship with stakeholders. The controllers may push on CG quality as a 
way of growing CSR exposes (Chen et al., 2014). The different level of external 
influences consists of the institutional and stakeholder pressures which companies adopt 
while building a CSR strategy (Lee, 2011). The paper drives seven areas: environment, 
community, CG, diversity, employee relations, human rights, and product quality and 
CSR initiatives have a higher stimulus on the firm performance and stakeholder appetite 
(Michelon, 2013). As is the case when looking at the liability of the board of directors 
when they formulate and monitor the company‘s communication strategies and that same 
management is responsible for the implementation (Gaa, 2009). The directors can help to 
govern the interest of stakeholders and support with the protection of the firm as 
stakeholders themselves in society (Hung, 2011). When the board of directors in a firm is 
diverse, it directly correlates with the enhancement of CSR performance within the 
company by providing consumer-oriented products and with other companies operating 
in a competitive environment (Harjoto et al., 2014). Applying stakeholder theory, there 
are projecting indicators that have led to escalating the effect and the impact of the 
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stakeholders‘ demands on the firm and in the response of which, a firm‘s corporate social 
performance, which will have more comprehensiveness (Brower and Mahajan, 2013). 
Despite previous research, Park et al (2014), new research has found that business 
collaborators would have negative and considerable influence on multi-national 
companies CSR activities. The result shows that both the main stakeholders, which are 
consumers, ‗internal managers and employees‘ and business collaborators and secondary 
stakeholders, which are governments, media, local community and NGOs positively 
touch MNEs‘ CSR. Most of the time stakeholders seem not to understand what CSR 
means and which poses a concern. Thus, the Western manager can play a vital role in the 
improvement of CG and CSR practice in the case of Russian companies (McCarthy and 
Puffer, 2008). At the same time a study was made on stakeholders across the new 
markets of the Middle East and Africa (MEA). Three multinational companies which 
consist of four nationality groups i.e. MENA, Western expatriate, Asia and he Sub-
Sahara, indicating that a complete definition is needed to be developed and 
communicated back to stakeholders which enhance the understanding of the company‘s 
specific CSR strategy (Munro, 2013). A chines study on 143 firms showed that the 
different market orientations are one of the biggest predictors of CSR, which are then, 
followed by government regulation that indicates that CSR is made up of two divisions, 
market forces and government actions (Lu, 2007). It is found that CSR and 
environmental disclosures have a direct relationship with a firm‘s size, industry 
classification, and profitability. Various stakeholders‘ responsibilities that have an effect 
on environmental disclosures and corporate social disclosures, are seen to be weak in 
China (Lu and Abeysekera, 2014). 
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2.1.18 CSR, CG & Ownership 
Structures that have fewer CSR concerns and mainly the family and founder owned 
firms, which means that the distinguishing between family and founder companies has to 
be done when analyzing CSR in large firms especially on ownership and management 
dimensions (Block and Wagner, 2014). In emerging markets, the ownership structure 
affects CSR. The result of the Chinese companies‘ responsibility ranking for mostly non-
state owned firms showed that there is a positive relationship between corporate 
ownership dispersion and CSR (Li and Zhang, 2010). The connection between CG, 
family ownership, and performance is specifically verified among the agency, 
stewardship, and contingency theory that are appropriate for Italian family firms. The 
board independence normally directly correlates with lower investments at IPO, in front 
of the more common venture capitalists that establish large and active boards 
(Giovannini, 2010). In the larger publicly traded firms, managerial ownership normally 
considerably lessens principal–agent conflicts, even in the existence of already set agency 
limitation mechanisms (Singh et al., 2003). The company ownership structure is 
unchanged by both compliance on agency costs and the voluntary governance of firms; 
the results have a wide range of impact on firms in Australia and even the global 
perspective (Henry, 2010). The connotation among the levels of ownership shares of 
director and the CSR performances, are specified in five sub-dimensions a negative 
association of the managerial ownership with employee relationships,  a negative relation 
to the variety scopes, and an inconsequential influence on the public, environment, and 
product dimensions (Paek et al., 2013). When a firm increases the ownership of the 
board, the effect becomes a reducing one for agency costs. Agency cost and role of board 
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size have a negative association with leverage in large companies. McKnight and Wier 
(2008) raised a few concerns about information that is sent to shareholders and how 
useful they prove to be when companies adopt a governance structure. Ownership 
structure and owner influence factors such as restructuring, activism, buy-and-hold, 
performance, strategy and governance process (Connelly, 2010).  The agency theory, in 
the case of China as an emerging country, brings other factors that have to be taken into 
account. Additional classifications are given to owners indicates that while shares bought 
by the state would impact CG negatively. However, a domestic buy in by institutions and 
managerial shareholdings will improve a firm‘s performance (Chen, 2001). A solution to 
state-owned enterprise would be a swift restructuring to develop CG which proved to 
improve the efficiency of companies, even though there would not be an ownership 
transfer or limits in terms it continues to shadow the effect on inefficiency in China (Su 
and He, 2012). A clear difference is seen in the corporate disclosure quality when the 
company has higher control rights within China. Therefore, when comparing companies 
owned by individuals to those controlled by the state, we find that the corporate 
disclosure is of lesser quality (Liu and Sun, 2010). Also, we find that in cases of fraud, 
the implications to the ownership structure along with that of the board tend to have a 
more suitable CG system as in the case of listed firms (Chen et al., 2006). After the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997 to improve corporate transparency and accountability did not 
affect corporate performance (Ghazali, 2010). Some evidence indicates that the 
connection between concentrated ownership, report lags, and listed firms tend to accept 
the appropriateness of price discovery in Malaysia while the companies that held the 
highest shareholder base to the government has demonstrated a delay in reporting (Lim et 
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al., 2014). In another study, it was found that in the case of Malaysia government 
ownership and audit committee play a significantly connected role that is positive when it 
comes to the level of CSR disclosure (Said et al., 2009). Corporate governance 
effectiveness is very imperative when looking at accountability of governments.It 
increase independence of the board, restrict hands of controlling shareholders, set up 
independent directors that are controlled by subcommittees, reform the supervisory 
board, and support the interests of both shareholders in the company and the managers of 
the firms (Wie and Geng, 2008).   
2.1.19 The Relation between Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial 
Performance 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a significant matter in modern international 
discussions. CSR appears to have become more global in the last two decades and is 
perceived, to corporations all over the world, as relevant (Aras and Crowther, 2008a). 
Also, the connection among business performance and CSR has adapted an 
unquestionable nature. Much of the previous research has been done on CSR deals with 
the problems that firms face in the development standards for management and reporting 
such unclassified activities. The way that CSR is often looked at, that the contrast 
between CSR activities and financial performance do exists, which proves problematic 
with each one being harmful to the other especially with taking firms determined on 
pursuing a value to shareholders. Moreover, a definition of what exactly institutes CSR 
has not been agreed on yet (Ortiz Martinez and Crowther, 2005) and consequently no 
agreement upon the basis for evaluating that activity and linking it to the numerous 
measurements of corporate performance. Howard Bowen‘s social responsibility of 
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business (Bowen, 1953) is pointed at by academics and practitioners as the first recorded 
attempt to examine and analyze the connection between firms and society (for example, 
Carroll, 1979; Preston, 1975; Wartick and Cochran, 1985). Most of the work that was 
conducted by both practitioners and scholars during the 1970‘s focused on how CSR is 
applied in businesses and the social environment. Fitch (1976) studied in depth the best 
procedure for the firm that desires to become socially responsible. Applied behavior 
analysis is used in Fitch‘s work as a way of social problem solution. Murray (1976) 
focused on commercial banking and the industries social response process to understand 
how banks differently respond to social pressure. Through the years, many empirical and 
theoretical debates have been taking place about the relationship between corporate social 
performances along with a firm‘s financial performance (see for example Aras and 
Crowther, 2007). One hundred twenty-seven published studies address the relationship 
between CSR and financial performance between 1972 and 2002 and each one has 
different measurement methods (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Two types of financial 
performance measures used in the studies to find the link between diverse aspects of firm 
performance and CSR. The first of the two is based on accounting through the 
understanding of the financial performance, but this has certain drawbacks. The main 
problem is that this measure only measures the historical performance of the firm and can 
mainly be affected by manipulations from managers and could produce outstanding 
results between organizations and that is because of the different accounting ways some 
firms apply. When using accounting-based measures, the characteristics of diverse 
sectors along with the risk associated with them should be taken into consideration. 
Stock-market-based measures can be used to deal with the shortcomings to evaluate a 
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firm‘s financial performance. The second type of measure is less associated with the 
businesses varying accounting measures and on managerial manipulation. Also, it is 
successful in finding the future economic earnings of firms rather than the past one. Even 
with this positive side, the shortcomings of this method is about the investors perception 
of the company may not be enough to show the financial performance (McGuire et al., 
1988; Ullmann, 1985). One of the studies that investigated this relationship from the 
perspective of environmental management practices (EMPs) is that of Montabon et al. 
(2007). An empirical study was conducted to investigate the link between EMPs and 
financial performance. They found a positive relationship between firm‘s performance 
and EMPs as a result of the application of content analysis methodology that was 
undertaken on 45 corporate reports (Montabon et al., 2007). While another study was 
done by Orlitzky et al. (2003), which found that, there is a strong correlation between 
CFP and corporate environmental/ social performance. The relationship is much stronger 
for the accounting based measures of performance than the market-based measures of 
performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003). In the work of Becchetti et al. (2005) with a sample 
of 1000 firms over a time of 13 years, it found that the sales were higher while return on 
equity was lower when looking at the levels per employee when R&D investing firms 
were not in the sample and also more socially responsible companies had lower returns 
on capital invested. Generally, it is expected to have a relationship of a positive attribute 
between CSR and financial performance, and this is in accordance to the thoughts of both 
stakeholders and agency theory. On the other hand, a very essential point that concerns 
stakeholders when thinking of developing and emerging economies in financial 
performance. When investing in emerging markets, investors are easily able to get excess 
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returns and therefore end up not caring about sustainability and CR in the long term. 
Therefore, it is unclear how to find the link between financial performance and CSR. The 
second point is about how CSR and financial performance are measured. Three foremost 
methods are used mainly with prior studies for measurement of CSR normally (McGuire 
et al., 1988). The expert evaluation of corporate policies is the first method. The success 
of this technique and its accuracy depends crucially on how much access the investigators 
could get a full scope of the activities and the expertise of the firm (Abbott and Monsen, 
1979). The content analysis of annual reports is the second methods along with other 
corporate documents. Weber (1990) ―a set of procedures to make valid inferences from 
the text‖ is the definition of content analysis. Krippendorff (2004, p.18) states ―content 
analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or 
other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use‖. Compared to other methods, 
content analysis has important advantages. After the variables that are to be used are 
picked, the method proves to be substantially objective and also allows the tester to use a 
much larger sample size. As is the case with other methods, this method has some 
disadvantages. The results of the method depend on the subjectivity of the selection 
variables where the firms normally choose the best variables and best annual reports, 
which creates a major drawback (Cochran and Wood, 1984). The third method for 
measurement of CSR is when the performance of companies in controlling pollution as a 
proxy measure (McGuire et al., 1988). Chen and Metcalf (1980) and Spicer (1978) used 
pollution control in their studies for the measurement of CSR. The drawback with this 
method is that this measure only concentrates on one variable of social responsibility and 
does not compensate for the difference in pollution from different industries. Different 
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results are produced from all the different methods. Data collection and reliability is the 
last point of CSR and financial performance measurement. As it is seen in the previous 
methods, most of the CSR data is totally reliant on the firms reporting process on 
activities that they can manipulate and misreport. Therefore, the collection and reliability 
of data testing are always problematic in such studies. Some other studies concentrate 
about exploring the link between a company‘s size and CSR. Udayasankar (2008) found 
a U-shaped link among firm size and CSR participation with extremely small and 
extremely big corporations being similarly interested to engage in CSR with medium-
sized firms having the lowest interest. Udayasankar made a conclusion about the firms 
that were researched that the characteristics should always consider when researching 
CSR context. Through a study made by Perrini et al. (2007), it was found that SMEs had 
participated less in environmental management than larger firms. The study investigates 
and examines the link between CSR and financial performance in businesses, which are 
based in developing countries through using the Turkish public companies as a test 
subject. Some of the problems rise from the lagging between different periods for CSR 
and financial performance. This study builds upon the idea that a relationship between 
firm size, profitability, risk level and CSR may exist. The relationship between 
performance management and CSR is shown as a very necessary study. The paper is 
therefore established through a clarification and validation of the data gathered and 
analysis undertaken, and then continues with the outcomes and a debate of their 
significance while concluding the concern of the consequences. 
2.2 Hypothesis 
 Hypothesis 1: Corporate Governance is positively related to Financial 
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Performance. 
 Hypothesis 2: Corporate Governance is positively related to Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
 Hypothesis 3: Corporate Social Responsibility is positively related to Financial 
Performance. 
 Hypothesis 4: Corporate Social Responsibility has a mediating effect on the 
relationship between Corporate Governance and Financial Performance. 
Based on the above literature, the following conceptual model is developed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Conceptual Model 
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Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY 
In this section, the methodology of this research is presented. It consists of the definition 
of variables, measurement techniques, sample, data collection, and statistical methods. 
3.1 Definition of Variables 
The measured variables were attained from the preceding indicated hypotheses. These 
variables were as well specified in the questionnaire; therefore, the gathered statistics 
would be significant to complete the research. The measured variables are the 
mechanisms of corporate governance: Transparency, level of ownership, and structure of 
board of directors; corporate social responsibility: social and non-social stakeholders, 
employees, customers, and government; and corporate financial performance: current 
performance and change in performance  
The Independent Variables: Board of Directors, social stakeholders, non-social 
stakeholders, employees, customers, and government 
The Dependent Variable: Transparency, level of ownership, current performance, change 
in performance, board diversity, independent board members, employees work life 
balance, customer satisfaction, taxes, legal regulations, market share, profit margin, and 
growth  
To conclude the data analysis, scores were constructed to measure the Corporate 
Governance Effectiveness score (CGES), Corporate social responsibility involvement 
score (CSRIS), corporate financial performance score (CFPS). These scores were 
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obtained from the set of questions related to corporate governance, corporate social 
responsibility, and corporate financial performance components. In addition to the overall 
effectiveness and the relationship among these three factors.  
The scores are conducted as follows: 
Part I: Questions associated with the Corporate Governance mechanisms effectiveness: 
CGES, which is the amount of the corporate governance mechanisms set of questions. 
These mechanisms include Transparency, the level of ownership, the structure of the 
board of directors, and Audit Committee (El Kassar, Messara, and El Gammal, 2014). 5-
point scale: ―strongly disagree‖ to ―strongly agree.‖ 
Transparency: 
 TRN1. Financial results 
 TRN2. Objectives of the company 
 TRN3. Accounting evaluations 
 TRN4. Related party transactions: elements and nature 
 TRN5. Related party transactions: practices and disclosure (under control) 
 TRN6. Board‘s duties and financial communications 
 TRN7. Extraordinary transactions regulations 
 TRN8. Alternative accounting decisions: impact and analysis 
 TRN9. The process for decision making and approval of transactions with related 
parties Part  
Level of Ownership: 
 OWN1. Structure of ownership 
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 OWN2. Control organization 
 OWN3. Control and equity stake 
 OWN4. Control privileges 
 OWN5. Existence of meeting agenda 
 OWN6. Procedures for holding annual meetings 
 OWN7. Shareholders diversity? Variations 
 OWN8. Actions for Anti-Takeovers 
 OWN9. Regulations that cover and guide the corporate control 
Board of Directors: 
 BRD1. Structure and goals of risk management 
 BRD2. Board of Director‘s structure: non-executives versus executive 
 BRD3. Information about board members such as qualifications and biographical 
information 
 BRD4. Responsibilities and positions of outside board members 
 BRD5. Position held by the executives and the number of outside board members 
 BRD6. Checks and balances instruments 
 BRD7. Presence of a succession plan 
 BRD8. Conflict of interest prevention through committees and governance 
procedures 
 BRD9. Governance committee composition and main task 
 BRD10. Board of directors: function and role 
 BRD11. Length of contracts for directors 
 BRD12. Composition of the remuneration of directors and its determinants 
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 BRD13. Number of independent board members 
 BRD14. Professional activities for training and development 
 BRD15. Reimbursement plan for senior managers in special cases such as merger 
and acquisition 
 BRD16. Presence of procedures covering conflicts of interest among board 
members 
 BRD17. Existence of advisors during reporting period 
 BRD18. Process for evaluating performance 
 BRD19. Management and board members‘ material interests 
Audit Committee 
 ADT1. Procedures governing collaboration with external auditors 
 ADT2. Procedures and responsibilities for appointing internal auditors 
 ADT3. Reliability of external auditors and board‘s confidence 
 ADT4. Procedures governing collaboration with internal auditors 
 ADT5. Decision-making procedure for appointing external auditors 
 ADT6. Internal control systems 
 ADT7. Period of auditor contracts 
 ADT8. Audit partner rotation process 
 ADT9. The remuneration of auditors and involvement in non-audit work 
Part II: Questions related to Corporate social responsibility involvement score (CSRIS) 
which is the sum of the following set of questions (Turker D, 2009). 5-point scale: 
―strongly disagree‖ to ―strongly agree.‖ 
CSR to social and non-social stakeholders 
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 CSRSTK1. Our company participates in the activities which aim to protect and 
improve the quality of the natural environment 
 CSRSTK2. Our company makes investment to create a better life for the future 
generations 
 CSRSTK3. Our company implements special programs to minimize its negative 
impact on the natural environment 
 CSRSTK4. Our company targets a sustainable growth which considers to the 
future generations 
 CSRSTK5. Our company supports the non-governmental organizations working 
in the problematic areas 
 CSRSTK6. Our company contributes to the campaigns and projects that promote 
the well-being of the society 
CSR to employees 
 CSREMP1. Our company encourages its employees to participate to the voluntary 
activities 
 CSREMP2.  Our company policies encourage the employees to develop their 
skills and careers 
 CSREMP3.  The management of our company primarily concerns with 
employees‘ needs and wants 
 CSREMP4.  Our company implements flexible policies to provide a good work 
and life balance for its employees 
 CSREMP5.  The managerial decisions related with the employees are usually fair 
 CSREMP6.  Our company supports employees who want to acquire additional 
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education 
CSR to customers 
 CSRCUS1. Our company protects consumer rights beyond the legal requirements 
 CSRCUS2.  Our company provides full and accurate information about its 
products to its customers 
 CSRCUS3.  Customer satisfaction is highly important for our company 
CSR to government 
 CSRGOV1. Our company always pays its taxes on a regular and continuing basis 
 CSRGOV2.  Our company complies with the legal regulations completely and 
promptly 
Part III: Questions related corporate financial performance score (CFPS) which is the 
sum of the following set of questions (El Kassar, Messara, and El Gammal, 2014). 1 for 
poor, 2 for fair, 3 for good, 4 for very good and 5 for excellent. 
Current Performance: 
 Pref1. Growth in sales 
 Pref2. Growth in market share 
 Pref3. Growth in employees 
 Pref4. Growth in profitability 
 Pref5. Profit margin on sales 
 Pref6. The ability to fund growth from profits 
Change in Performance compared to last year: (5-point scale ―much worse‖ to ―Higher 
than‖) 
 ChgPref1. Growth in sales 
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 ChgPref2. Growth in market share 
 ChgPref3. Growth in employees 
 ChgPref4. Growth in profitability 
 ChgPref5. Profit margin on sales 
 ChgPref6. The ability to fund growth from profits 
3.2 Measurement Techniques 
The questionnaire was divided into four segments. The first segment contains the 
demographical data of the respondent (gender, age, degree level, specialization, years of 
experience, and professional certificate). The second segment contains the effectiveness 
of the components of corporate governance. The third segment contains the involvement 
in corporate social responsibility. The fourth segment contains corporate financial 
performance. 
The questionnaire was aimed to take about a maximum of 7 minutes from the 
respondent‘s time, therefore increasing the number of participants and decreasing 
decliners. 
3.3 Sample 
The appropriate selection was used in this study. First, secondary data was acquired from 
the previous questionnaire used. The objective selection was the working population, 
generally the age group of 21 and above working in different levels (operational, middle 
to top management) and departments, such as accounting/auditing department, business 
administration department, financial department, etc. The selection also included the 
shareholders from small investors to block holders.  
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Data were collected using convenience selection and were added to this research. Out of 
200 questionnaires distributed, 123 finished the questionnaire. The respondents included 
25 shareholders, four audit firm, 20 banks, five universities, seven insurance companies, 
and five software companies. Therefore, the selection used to conduct the research 
involves of a total of 123 respondents. 
3.4 Data Collection 
The data collection method was quantitative. A convenient sampling was used, most of 
the respondents were LAU Alumni, graduates, and students. All the respondents had 
knowledge of the topic. Some respondents were first contacted through phone calls to get 
their private emails. Then the survey was sent by email to the selected candidates. The 
candidates were followed up so that the maximum number of respondents can be 
targeted. Other respondents distributed the survey among colleagues at work who were 
familiar with the topic.   
3.5 Statistical Methods 
To analyze the data SPSS statistical program was used, to classify the association 
between the independent and dependent variables. Correlation based analysis was used to 
identify the relationship among each corporate governance, corporate social 
responsibility, and corporate financial performance mechanisms and the relationship 
among them. Also, PLS-SEM method using the SmartPLS 3 software was used to 
distinguish the relationships of the components on each of corporate governance, 
corporate social responsibility, and corporate financial performance. 
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3.5.1 Demographics 
1- Company size 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 to 9 14 11.4 11.4 11.4 
10 to 19 13 10.6 10.6 22.0 
20 to 50 16 13.0 13.0 35.0 
More than 50 80 65.0 65.0 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
2- Board size 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 to 4 25 20.3 20.3 20.3 
5 to 10 64 52.0 52.0 72.4 
More than 10 34 27.6 27.6 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
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3- Number of Meetings of the directors 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1 to 3 47 38.2 38.2 38.2 
4 to 6 37 30.1 30.1 68.3 
More than 6 39 31.7 31.7 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
4- CEO Compensation 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Less than $100,000 16 13.0 13.0 13.0 
$100,000 to $150,000 37 30.1 30.1 43.1 
$150,000 to $250,000 24 19.5 19.5 62.6 
More than $250,000 46 37.4 37.4 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
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5- Family in the Board  
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Yes 78 63.4 63.4 63.4 
No 45 36.6 36.6 43.9 
     
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
6- Decisions By Family Members 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Always 28 22.8 22.8 22.8 
Sometimes 95 77.2 77.2 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
 
 
7- Sales 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Less than $100,000 12 9.8 9.8 9.8 
$100,000 to $500,000 29 23.6 23.6 33.3 
$500,000 to $1,000,000 16 13.0 13.0 46.3 
More than $1,000,000 66 53.7 53.7 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
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8- Change in sales 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Decreased Significantly 5 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Decreased Slightly 8 6.5 6.5 10.6 
No Change 15 12.2 12.2 22.8 
Increased Slightly 51 41.5 41.5 64.2 
Increased Significantly 44 35.8 35.8 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
9-  Debt 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Less than 25% 33 26.8 26.8 26.8 
25% to 50% 73 59.3 59.3 86.2 
More than 50% 17 13.8 13.8 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
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10- Qualifications 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid No Degree 16 13.0 13.0 13.0 
University Degree 107 87.0 87.0 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
11- Specialization 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Accounting & Auditing 50 40.7 40.7 40.7 
Banking & Finance 24 19.5 19.5 60.2 
Business Administration 36 29.3 29.3 89.4 
Other 13 10.6 10.6 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
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12- Years of Experience  
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Less than 5 29 23.6 23.6 23.6 
5 to 10 46 37.4 37.4 61.0 
More than 10 48 39.0 39.0 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
 
 
 
13- Certifications 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid CA 9 7.3 7.3 7.3 
CPA 50 40.7 40.7 48.0 
CIA 10 8.1 8.1 56.1 
Other 23 18.7 18.7 74.8 
None 31 25.2 25.2 100.0 
Total 123 100.0 100.0 
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3.5.2 Factor Analysis 
The various components of corporate governance and CSR were factors analyzed to 
confirm the uni-dimensionality of the components. In each case, a single score 
representing the component was obtained. The scores were later used as the indicators for 
CG and CSR. Similarly, the two performance category measures were factor analyzed, 
and a score for each category was obtained.   The results of the factor analysis are as 
following tables: 
14- Transparency Communalities  
 
Initial Extraction 
TRS1 1.000 .661 
TRS2 1.000 .734 
TRS3 1.000 .593 
TRS4 1.000 .493 
TRS6 1.000 .610 
TRS7 1.000 .482 
TRS8 1.000 .681 
TRS9 1.000 .625 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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15- Transparency Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.879 60.989 60.989 4.879 60.989 60.989 
2 .930 11.621 72.611    
3 .799 9.983 82.594    
4 .527 6.582 89.176    
5 .313 3.910 93.086    
6 .242 3.029 96.116    
7 .194 2.424 98.540    
8 .117 1.460 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
16- Transparency Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
TRS1 .813 
TRS2 .857 
TRS3 .770 
TRS4 .702 
TRS6 .781 
TRS7 .694 
TRS8 .825 
TRS9 .790 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
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17- OwnershipCommunalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
OWN1 1.000 .598 
OWN2 1.000 .693 
OWN3 1.000 .792 
OWN4 1.000 .825 
OWN5 1.000 .485 
OWN6 1.000 .604 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
18- Ownership Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.996 66.602 66.602 3.996 66.602 66.602 
2 .727 12.122 78.725    
3 .578 9.629 88.353    
4 .387 6.457 94.810    
5 .179 2.984 97.795    
6 .132 2.205 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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19- Ownership Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
OWN1 .774 
OWN2 .832 
OWN3 .890 
OWN4 .908 
OWN5 .696 
OWN6 .777 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
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20- Board of Directors Communalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
BRD5 1.000 .510 
BRD6 1.000 .574 
BRD7 1.000 .478 
BRD8 1.000 .581 
BRD9 1.000 .584 
BRD12 1.000 .470 
BRD16 1.000 .528 
BRD17 1.000 .468 
BRD18 1.000 .500 
BRD19 1.000 .587 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
21- Board of Directors Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.281 52.813 52.813 5.281 52.813 52.813 
2 .943 9.428 62.241    
3 .890 8.904 71.146    
4 .790 7.903 79.049    
5 .560 5.601 84.650    
6 .432 4.322 88.972    
7 .413 4.129 93.101    
8 .325 3.249 96.350    
9 .191 1.907 98.257    
10 .174 1.743 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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22- Board of Directors Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
BRD5 .714 
BRD6 .758 
BRD7 .691 
BRD8 .762 
BRD9 .764 
BRD12 .686 
BRD16 .727 
BRD17 .684 
BRD18 .707 
BRD19 .766 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
23- Attended Meetings Communalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
ADT1 1.000 .538 
ADT2 1.000 .600 
ADT3 1.000 .684 
ADT4 1.000 .574 
ADT5 1.000 .667 
ADT6 1.000 .636 
ADT7 1.000 .425 
ADT8 1.000 .414 
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24- Attended Meetings Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.537 56.714 56.714 4.537 56.714 56.714 
2 1.245 15.558 72.272    
3 .913 11.408 83.680    
4 .452 5.645 89.325    
5 .308 3.848 93.174    
6 .227 2.832 96.006    
7 .217 2.716 98.722    
8 .102 1.278 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
25- Attended Meetings Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
ADT1 .734 
ADT2 .774 
ADT3 .827 
ADT4 .758 
ADT5 .817 
ADT6 .797 
ADT7 .652 
ADT8 .644 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
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Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
26- Social to Non Social Communalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
CSRSTK1 1.000 .608 
CSRSTK2 1.000 .571 
CSRSTK3 1.000 .637 
CSRSTK4 1.000 .655 
CSRSTK6 1.000 .516 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
27- Social to Non Social Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.987 59.747 59.747 2.987 59.747 59.747 
2 .644 12.871 72.618    
3 .577 11.532 84.150    
4 .476 9.520 93.670    
5 .316 6.330 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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28- Social to Non Social Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
CSRSTK1 .780 
CSRSTK2 .756 
CSRSTK3 .798 
CSRSTK4 .810 
CSRSTK6 .718 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
29- Employee Communalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
CSREMP1 1.000 .474 
CSREMP2 1.000 .581 
CSREMP6 1.000 .582 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
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30- Employee Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.637 54.562 54.562 1.637 54.562 54.562 
2 .740 24.679 79.241    
3 .623 20.759 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
31- Employee Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
CSREMP1 .689 
CSREMP2 .762 
CSREMP6 .763 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
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a. 1 components extracted. 
32- Customers Communalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
CSRCST1 1.000 .584 
CSRCST2 1.000 .674 
CSRCST3 1.000 .632 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
33- Customers Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.890 62.990 62.990 1.890 62.990 62.990 
2 .611 20.354 83.344    
3 .500 16.656 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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34- Customers Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
CSRCST1 .764 
CSRCST2 .821 
CSRCST3 .795 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
 
 
35- Performance Communalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
Perf1 1.000 .696 
Perf2 1.000 .704 
Perf3 1.000 .655 
Perf4 1.000 .833 
Perf5 1.000 .649 
Perf6 1.000 .805 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
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36- Performance Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 4.342 72.368 72.368 4.342 72.368 72.368 
2 .540 9.006 81.374    
3 .393 6.545 87.918    
4 .338 5.636 93.555    
5 .234 3.899 97.454    
6 .153 2.546 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
37- Performance Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
Perf1 .834 
Perf2 .839 
Perf3 .809 
Perf4 .913 
Perf5 .806 
Perf6 .897 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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a. 1 components extracted. 
 
38- Change in Performance Communalities 
 
Initial Extraction 
ChgPerf1 1.000 .680 
ChgPerf2 1.000 .596 
ChgPerf3 1.000 .383 
ChgPerf4 1.000 .682 
ChgPerf5 1.000 .675 
ChgPerf6 1.000 .607 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
39- Change in Performance Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.624 60.398 60.398 3.624 60.398 60.398 
2 .834 13.892 74.291    
3 .593 9.881 84.171    
4 .416 6.935 91.106    
5 .312 5.205 96.311    
6 .221 3.689 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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40- Change in Performance Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 
ChgPerf1 .825 
ChgPerf2 .772 
ChgPerf3 .619 
ChgPerf4 .826 
ChgPerf5 .822 
ChgPerf6 .779 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
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Summarizing the results of the confirmatory factor analysis 8 out of 9 transparency 
components were used to construct a single score for this latent variable, and the loading 
factor ranged from 0.694 to 0.859. This score has an extraction sum of square loading of 
60.99%. 
Similarly for the other components of CG, CSR, and CFP: 
Score Item Loading Range Extraction 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadings 
TRS TRS1, TRS2,TRS3,TRS4,TRS6,TRS7, TRS8, 
TRS9 
0.694 – o.825 60.99% 
OWN OWN1,OWN2,OWN3, OWN4, OWN5, 
OWN6 
0.696 – 0.908 66.602% 
BRD BRD5, BRD6,, BRD7, BRD8, BRD9, BRD12, 
BRD16, BRD17, BRD18, BRD19 
0.686 – 0.766 52.813% 
ADT ADT1,  ADT2, ADT3, ADT4, ADT5, ADT6, 
ADT7, ADT8 
0.644 – 0.827 56.714% 
CSRSTK CSRSTK1, CSRSTK2, CSRSTK3, CSRSTK4, 
CSRSTK6 
0.718 – 0.810 59.747% 
CSREMP CSREMP1, CSREMP2, CSREMP6 0.689 – 0.763 54.562% 
CSRCST CSRCST1, CSRCST2, CSRCST3 0.764 – 0.821 62.990% 
Perf Perf1, Perf2, Perf3, Perf4, Perf5, Perf6 0.806 – 0.913 72.368% 
ChgPerf  ChgPerf 1, ChgPerf 2, ChgPerf 3, ChgPerf 4, 
ChgPerf 5, ChgPerf 6 
0.619 – 0,826 60.398% 
 
3.5.3Structural Model 
Using the scores obtained from the Confirmatory Factor Analysis, the conceptual model 
of Figure 1 was tested. The four CG scores, TRS, OWN, BRD, and ADT, were used as 
the indicators for the latent variable CG. Similarly, the scores STK, EMP, and CUS were 
used as the indicators for the latent variable CSR. Finally, the two performance scores 
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PRF and CHG were the two indicators of the financial performance. Figure 2 depicts the 
PLS-SEM results.      
Figure 2: Structural Model
 
 
The model was checked for reliability and the validity. The outer loadings of the model, 
shown in the table below, indicate that model is valid since all loading factors are above 
the minimum level of 0.7.   
 
41- Outer Loadings 
  CG CSR PRFM 
ADT 0.796     
BRD 0.776     
CHG     0.880 
CUS   0.762   
EMP   0.707   
OWN 0.833     
PRF     0.883 
STK   0.788   
TRS 0.758     
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Reliability is established from the fact that most of the composite reliability and 
Cronbach‘s alpha values are above 0.7.     
42- Composite Reliability 
  
Composite 
Reliability 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
 
CG 0.870 
0.801  
CSR 0.797 
0.622  
PRFM 0.875 
0.714  
 
The bootstrap method with n = 5000 was applied to determine the significance of the 
path coefficients. The direct effect results are shown in the table below. 
 
43- Mean, STDEV, T-Values, P-Values 
      
  
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STDEV|) 
P Values 
CG  CSR 0.873 0.878 0.019 45.291 0.000 
CG  PRFM 0.510 0.540 0.141 3.623 0.000 
CSR  PRFM 0.468 0.440 0.129 3.618 0.000 
      
      44- Confidence Intervals 
  
      
  
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample Mean 
(M) 
2.5% 97.5% 
 CG  CSR 0.873 0.878 0.839 0.915 
 CG  PRFM 0.510 0.540 0.289 0.781 
 CSR  PRFM 0.468 0.440 0.214 0.671 
 
       
Both the p-value results (all below 0.05) and the confidence interval results (none 
includes a zero) indicate that all three paths have positive significant coefficients. This 
provide evidence to support hypotheses H1, H2, and H3.  
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The indirect effect and the total effect results obtained from the original model and 
bootstrapping are shown in the table below. 
45- Indirect Effects 
Mean, STDEV, T-Values, P-Values 
      
  
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STDEV|) 
P 
Values 
CG  
CSR 
          
CG  
PRFM 
0.409 0.386 0.113 3.620 0.000 
CSR  
PRFM 
          
 
 
46- Total Effects 
Mean, STDEV, T-Values, P-Values 
      
  
Original 
Sample (O) 
Sample 
Mean (M) 
Standard Deviation 
(STDEV) 
T Statistics 
(|O/STDEV|) 
P 
Values 
CG  CSR 0.873 0.878 0.019 45.291 0.000 
CG  PRFM 0.919 0.926 0.031 30.035 0.000 
CSR  PRFM 0.468 0.440 0.129 3.618 0.000 
 
The above results show that there is an indirect effect between CG and financial 
performance through CSR. This support hypothesis H4. Hence, the relationship between 
CG and financial performance is partially mediated by CRS.  
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Chapter IV 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
Corporations have concentrated their efforts on the board of directors‘ practices and 
measures to achieve the most substantial effectiveness.  These practices were 
implemented to decrease the riskiness of a firm‘s stock returns and therefore ensuing 
higher returns to shareholders. These measures also focus on the financial performance of 
how the company‘s earnings respond to diverse managerial policies.  On the other hand, 
there have been rising pressures on corporations that are practicing corporate social 
responsibility (CSR).  Debates have been discussed on whether or not corporations that 
are actively involved in CSR will operate and perform better than other corporations 
which do not exhibit similar levels of social practices. This raises the question if 
improvement in financial performance can be a result of CSR practices implemented by 
the firm and its board members. This study examined the association among Corporate 
Governance (CG) and financial performance, and it will also explore the possible 
mediating effect of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on the aforementioned 
relationship. Empirical evidence of this quantitative study will be provided from the 
analysis of data collected through a self-administered questionnaire distributed to 
managers of companies operating in Lebanon. 
 
Using survey data collected from a sample of 123 employees working in various 
companies in Lebanon, the conceptual model was tested. Confirmatory factor analysis 
was used to construct scores for each CG and CSR component as well as scores for the 
performance measures. These scores were used to test the conceptual model by applying 
PLS-SEM using SmartPLS3. After checking the model for reliability and the validity, the 
bootstrap method was implemented to determine the significance of the path coefficients. 
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The direct effect results are showed that all three paths have positive significant 
coefficients; hence, providing evidence to support hypotheses H1, H2, and H3.  
The indirect effect and the total effect results obtained from the original model and 
bootstrapping also showed that there is a significant indirect effect between CG and 
financial performance through CSR; thus providing evidence to support hypothesis H4. 
Hence, the relationship between CG and financial performance is partially mediated by 
CRS.  
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Appendix “A” 
Agreement to participate in a Survey/Questionnaire 
“The Mediating Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on the Relationship 
between Corporate Governance and Financial Performance” 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research thesis. You are being asked to 
complete a short questionnaire. I am an MBA student at the Lebanese American 
University.  It is appreciated if you can complete the following questionnaire as part of 
my research thesis, therefore the gathered statistics would be significant to complete the 
research. This questionnaire aims to gather information for the purpose of supporting the 
theoretical study on corporate social responsibility and corporate governance and their 
role in in the corporate financial performance.    
 
The information you provide will be used to enhance and improve the practices of 
corporate governance to better govern any corporation and increase its performance. 
These practices involve activities that are socially responsible towards a company‘s 
employees, customers, and the government.     
Completing the survey will take approximately seven minutes of your time.   
 
By continuing with the questionnaire, you approve with the following statements: 
 
1. I have been given sufficient information about this research project. 
2. I understand that my answers will not be released to anyone and my identity will 
remain anonymous. My name will not be written on the questionnaire nor be kept in 
any other records.  
3. I understand that all responses I provide for this study will remain 
confidential.  When the results of the study are reported, I will not be identified 
by name or any other information that could be used to infer my identity. Only 
researchers will have access to view any data collected during this research however 
data cannot be linked to me.  
4. I understand that I may withdraw from this research any time I wish and that I have 
the right to skip any question I don‘t want to answer.   
5. I understand that my refusal to participate will not result in any penalty or loss of 
benefits to which I otherwise am entitled to. 
6. I have been informed that the research abides by all commonly acknowledged ethical 
codes and that the research project has been reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board at the Lebanese American University  
7. I understand that if I have any additional questions, I can ask the research team listed 
below. 
8. I have read and understood all statements on this form.  
9. I voluntarily agree to take part in this research project by completing the following 
survey. 
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If you have any questions, you may contact:  
Name (PI) Phone number Email address 
AbdulRahman AlKassar 0096171586559 Abdulrahman.alkassar@lau.edu 
Walid El Gammal 0096171314308 Walid.elgammal@lau.edu.lb 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, or you want to 
talk to someone outside the research, please contact the: 
 
IRB Office, 
Lebanese American University  
3
rd
 Floor, Dorm A, Byblos Campus 
Tel: 00 961 1 786456 ext. (2546) 
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Please tick or/ circle the appropriate answer: 
1) Your organization size:     a) 1 - 9 employees; b) 10 - 19 employees  
c) 20 - 50 employees;   d) > 50 employees 
2) Your organization‘s board of directors size: 
a) 1 - 4 members;   b) 5 - 10 members; c)> 10 members 
3) How many times does the board meet per year? 
1) 1 - 3 times 
2) 4 - 6 times  
3) > 6 times      
4)  CEO compensation: 
1) < 50,000 $ 
2) 50,000 - 99,000 $ 
3) 100,000 - 149,000 $ 
4) 150,000 - 250,000$ 
5) > 250,000 $   
5) Do family members who are not members of the legal board attend the meeting? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
6) Do family members engage and participate in board decisions? 
1) Always 
2) Sometimes 
3) Never  
7) Approximately what are the sales revenues per year? 
1) < 100,000 $     
2) 100,000 - 499,000 $ 
3) 500,000 - 1,000,000 $ 
4) > 1,000,000 $ 
8) Over the past five years the average annual sales revenue has: 
1) Decreased significantly  
2) Decreased slightly  
3) No change  
4) Increased slightly 
5) Increased significantly 
9) Combined long term and short term debt is approximately what % of equity? 
1) 1 - 25% 
2) 26 - 50% 
3) > 50% 
 
10) Qualifications: a) No degree  b) Graduate   
 
11) Specialization: a) Accounting and auditing  b) Banking science  
     c) Business Administration  c) Another set 
 
12) Years of experience: a) ˂ 5 years  b) 5-10 years  c) ˃ 10 years 
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13) Professional certificate: a) CA  b) CPA  c) CIA  
       d) Another set e) No 
 
14) Age: a) ˂ 30 years  b) 30-40 years  c) ˃ 40 years 
 
15) Gender: a) Male  b) Female 
 
For each of the questions, please circle the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of transparency of financial data in terms of 
 
 SD D N A SA 
CGTRN1. Financial results      
CGTRN2. Objectives of the company      
CGTRN3. Accounting evaluations      
CGTRN4. Related party transactions: elements and 
nature 
     
CGTRN5. Related party transactions: practices and 
disclosure (under control) 
     
CGTRN6. Board‘s duties and financial 
communications 
     
CGTRN7. Extraordinary transactions regulations      
CGTRN8. Alternative accounting decisions: impact 
and analysis 
     
CGTRN9. The process for decision making and 
approval of transactions with related parties Part  
     
 
 
For each of the questions, please circle the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of Ownership structure and control privileges  
 
 SD D N A SA 
CGOWN1. Structure of ownership      
CGOWN2. Control organization      
CGOWN3. Control and equity stake      
CGOWN4. Control privileges      
CGOWN5. Existence of meeting agenda      
CGOWN6. Procedures for holding annual meetings      
CGOWN7. Shareholders diversity? Variations      
CGOWN8. Actions for Anti-Takeovers      
CGOWN9. Regulations that cover and guide the 
corporate control 
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For each of the questions, please circle the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of  Structure of Board of Directors and Management in terms of  
 
 SD D N A SA 
CGBRD1. Structure and goals of risk management      
CGBRD2. Board of director‘s structure: non-
executives versus executive 
     
CGBRD3. Information about board members such as 
qualifications and biographical information 
     
CGBRD4. Responsibilities and positions of outside 
board members 
     
CGBRD5. Position held by the executives and the 
number of outside board members 
     
CGBRD6. Checks and balances instruments      
CGBRD7. Presence of a succession plan      
CGBRD8. Conflict of interest prevention through 
committees and governance procedures 
     
CGBRD9. Governance committee composition and 
main task 
     
CGBRD10. Board of directors: function and role      
CGBRD11. Length of contracts for directors      
CGBRD12. Composition of the remuneration of 
directors and its determinants 
     
CGBRD13. Number of independent board members      
CGBRD14. Professional activities for training and 
development 
     
CGBRD15. Reimbursement plan for senior managers 
in special cases such as merger and acquisition 
     
CGBRD16. Presence of procedures covering conflicts 
of interest among board members 
     
CGBRD17. Existence of advisors during reporting 
period 
     
CGBRD18. Process for evaluating performance      
CGBRD19. Management and board members‘ material 
interests 
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For each of the questions, please circle the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of CG in the analysis of auditing committee and elements in terms of 
 
 SD D N A SA 
CGADT1. Procedures governing collaboration with 
external auditors 
     
CGADT2. Procedures and responsibilities for 
appointing internal auditors 
     
CGADT3. Reliability of external auditors and board‘s 
confidence 
     
CGADT4. Procedures governing collaboration with 
internal auditors 
     
CGADT5. Decision making procedure for appointing 
external auditors 
     
CGADT6. Internal control systems      
CGADT7. Period of auditor contracts      
CGADT8. Audit partner rotation process      
CGADT9. The remuneration of auditors and 
involvement in non-audit work 
     
 
 
For each of the questions, please circle the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of CSR to social and non-social stakeholders in terms of 
 
 SD D N A SA 
CSRSTK1. Our company participates to the activities 
which aim to protect and improve the quality of the 
natural environment 
     
CSRSTK2. Our company makes investment to create a 
better life for the future generations 
     
CSRSTK3. Our company implements special 
programs to minimize its negative impact on the 
natural environment 
     
CSRSTK4. Our company targets a sustainable growth 
which considers to the future generations 
     
CSRSTK5. Our company supports the non-
governmental organizations working in the 
problematic areas 
     
CSRSTK6. Our company contributes to the campaigns 
and projects that promote the well-being of the society 
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For each of the questions, please circle the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of CSR to employees in terms of 
 
 SD D N A SA 
CSREMP1.Our company encourages its employees to 
participate to the voluntarily activities 
     
CSREMP2. Our company policies encourage the 
employees to develop their skills and careers 
     
CSREMP3. The management of our company primarily 
concerns with employees‘ needs and wants 
     
CSREMP4. Our company implements flexible policies 
to provide a good work and life balance for its 
employees 
     
CSREMP5. The managerial decisions related with the 
employees are usually fair 
     
CSREMP6. Our company supports employees who 
want to acquire additional education 
     
 
For each of the questions, please circle the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of CSR to customers in terms of 
 
 
 SD D N A SA 
CSRCUS1. Our company protects consumer rights 
beyond the legal requirements 
     
CSRCUS2. Our company provides full and accurate 
information about its products to its customers 
     
CSRCUS3.  Customer satisfaction is highly important 
for our company 
     
 
For each of the questions, please circle the most appropriate answer. There is an 
ample level of CSR to government in terms of 
 
 SD D N A SA 
CSRGOV1. Our company always pays its taxes on a 
regular and continuing basis 
     
CSRGOV2. Our company complies with the legal 
regulations completely and promptly 
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In question 20, tick 1 for poor, 2 for fair, 3 for good,4 for very good and 5 for 
excellent. 
 
Please indicate your company’s level of performance in terms of: 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
CFPCP1. Growth in sales 
          
CFPCP2. Growth in market share 
          
CFPCP3. Growth in employees 
          
CFPCP4. Growth in profitability 
          
CFPCP5. Profit margin on sales 
          
CFPCP6. The ability to fund growth from profits 
          
 
 
 
Please indicate if your current performance compared to past performance in terms 
of:  
 
  
Much 
Worse 
 
Worse 
 
About 
the 
Same 
 
Slightly 
Higher 
Higher 
than 
CFPCHGP1. Growth in sales         
CFPCHGP2. Growth in market 
share   
 
  
 
  
CFPCHGP3. Growth in 
employees   
 
  
 
  
CFPCHGP4. Growth in 
profitability   
 
  
 
  
CFPCHGP5. Profit margin on 
sales   
 
  
 
  
CFPCHGP6. The ability to 
fund growth from profits   
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